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ORIGINALISM AND ITS DISCONTENTS 
(PLUS A THOUGHT OR TWO ABOUT 
ABORTION) 
Mitchell N. Berman* 
In Abortion and Original Meaning,1
 
Jack Balkin presents an 
intriguing new argument for the soundness of the result, though 
not the reasoning, of Roe v. Wade.2 Balkin is one of his genera-
tion’s widest ranging and most consistently engaging legal theo-
rists, and his analyses of the original principles undergirding the 
Fourteenth Amendment and how they bear on the debate over 
abortion is characteristically thought-provoking. But they are of-
fered in service of a “larger purpose”—namely, “to demonstrate 
why the debate between originalism and living constitutionalism 
rests on a false dichotomy.”3 Once we “reject the assumption 
that fidelity to the [constitutional] text means fidelity to original 
expected application,” Balkin contends, we ought instead to 
agree that “constitutional interpretation requires fidelity to the 
original meaning of the Constitution and to the principles that 
underlie the text.”4 In maintaining such fidelity, however, 
“[e]ach generation makes the Constitution their Constitution by 
calling upon its text and its principles and arguing about what 
they mean in their own time.”5 It follows, Balkin claims, that 
“[t]he choice between original meaning and living constitutional-
ism . . . is a false ch 6
 *  Bernard J. Ward Centennial Professor in Law, The University of Texas at Aus-
tin. E-mail: mberman@law.utexas.edu. 
 1. Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291 
(2007). 
 2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 3. Balkin, supra note 1, at 292. 
 4. Id. at 293. 
 5. Id. at 301 
 6. Id. at 293. See also id. at 306 (“The tradition of continuous arguments about 
how best to implement constitutional meaning in our own time produces changes in con-
stitutional doctrines, practices, and law. That is why, ultimately, there is no conflict be-
tween fidelity to text and principle and practices of constitutionalism that evolve over 
time.”). 
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I believe that Balkin mischaracterizes contemporary 
originalism. Although Justice Scalia constitutes a striking—but 
possibly only partial—counter-example, an overwhelming num-
ber of contemporary constitutional theorists who actively defend 
originalism have already rejected the assumption that Balkin 
asks them to reject. While there does exist a live intramural dis-
agreement among originalists concerning whether to abide by 
the originally intended meaning of the framers (or ratifiers) of 
constitutional text or the text’s original public meaning, almost 
nobody espouses fidelity to the originally expected applications. 
More important, though, is what follows once we all reject 
what Ronald Dworkin dubbed “expectation originalism.”7 
Balkin’s conclusion that originalism and non-originalism present 
a false choice rests squarely on his argument that fidelity to the 
Constitution requires fidelity to its original meaning and pre-
cludes contemporary interpreters from interpreting its text in ac-
cordance with other principles that the text can bear.8 But non-
originalists simply do not agree that fidelity to the Constitution 
requires fidelity to the original meaning “and the principles it 
was designed to enact.”9 And nothing in Balkin’s article, I will 
argue, should convince them that what they see as a true choice 
is in fact a false one. In short, then, Abortion and Original Mean-
ing is unlikely to make anybody happy: Its empirical claims 
about the state of originalist argumentation are apt to gall the 
originalists, while its normative (or perhaps conceptual) claims 
about what constitutional interpretation requires will fail to 
move the non-originalists. Part I of these remarks argues that 
theorists in both camps have reason to be d
Of course, even if Balkin’s claims about interpretive theory 
fail, his narrower arguments about abortion rights might none-
theless succeed. Unfortunately, I do not believe that Balkin of-
fers us a sounder basis upon which to rest the conclusion that 
legislative prohibition of abortion is unconstitutional. Part II 
briefly explains why. 
 7. Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE LAW 115, 119 (Amy Gutman ed., 1997). 
 8. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 1, at 303 (“We look to underlying principles be-
cause when the text uses relatively abstract and general concepts, we must know which 
principles the text presumes or is attempting to embrace. If we read the text to presume 
or embrace other principles, then we may be engaged in a play on words and we will not 
be faithful to the Constitution’s purposes.”). 
 9. Id. at 293 (emphasis added). 
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I. ORIGINALISM AND LIVING CONSTITUTIONALISM 
A. EXPECTATION ORIGINALISM: NOT A TRUE OPPONENT 
According to Balkin, self-described originalists, along with 
their adversaries, believe that expected applications of constitu-
tional provisions are binding on present-day interpreters. This, 
he argues, is an unsatisfactory view. I agree.10 The question, 
though, is whether it’s a live one. After all, the view was ad-
dressed at length a decade ago—and, I would have thought, de-
molished—in an important article by Mark Greenberg and 
Harry Litman.11 As they explained, “original meaning, properly 
understood, must contemplate the possibility that a traditional 
practice is unconstitutional.”12 In part, this is because, as they ar-
gued with care, “requiring fidelity to original practices is incon-
sistent with interpreting constitutional provisions to stand for 
principles.”13 Not surprisingly, then, leading academic defenders 
of originalism have been disavowing expectation originalism for 
years. Writing just last year in the Yale Law Journal, for exam-
ple, Michael Paulsen protested that it is “a caricature of original-
ism” to portray it as “a version of crude intentionalism that fo-
cuses on the specific subjective intentions or expectations of 
individuals as to how a provision might be applied.”14 Michael 
McConnell was even more blunt. “[N]o reputable originalist, 
with the possible exception of Raoul Berger, takes the view that 
the Framers’ ‘assumptions and expectations about the correct 
application’ of their principles is controlling,” he argued a dec-
ade ago. “Mainstream originalists recognize that the Framers’ 
analysis of particular applications could be wrong, or that cir-
cumstances could have changed and made them wrong.”15 
 10. I am disinclined, however, to second Balkin’s claim that “[t]he basic problem 
with looking to original expected application for guidance is that it is inconsistent with so 
much of our existing constitutional traditions.” Balkin, supra note 1, at 297. I am dis-
posed, rather, to think that the most formidable objection to expectation originalism is 
grounded in our best understanding of the logical structure of constitutional adjudication. 
But that’s another story. 
 11. Mark D. Greenberg & Harry Litman, The Meaning of Original Meaning, 86 
GEO. L.J. 569 (1998). 
 12. Id. at 570–71. 
 13. Id. at 571. 
 14. Michael Stokes Paulsen, How To Interpret the Constitution (and How Not To), 
115 YALE  L.J.. 2037, 2059 (2006). 
 15. Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A 
Comment on Ronald Dwokin’s “Moral Reading” of the Constitution, 65 FORD. L. REV. 
1269, 1284 (1997). 
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Swimming against this tide,16
 
Balkin asserts loosely that 
“[o]riginalists generally assume that if we do not apply the con-
stitutional text in the way it was originally understood at the 
time of its adoption we are not following what the words mean 
and so will not be faithful to the Constitution as law,” and that 
“they have tended to conflate two different ideas—the expected 
application of constitutional texts, which is not binding law, and 
the original meaning, which is.”17 “Many originalists,” he adds, 
“have encouraged this conflation . . . [and] living constitutional-
ists too have mostly accepted this conflation without question.”18
 
But the evidence offered of this supposed general assumption 
and tendency toward conflation is sparse. In fact, the only 
originalist theorist Balkin discusses at any length is Justice Scalia 
who, says Balkin, “insists that the concepts and principles under-
lying [the constitutional text] must be applied in the same way 
that they would have been applied when they were adopted.”19 
As I read him, Scalia’s relationship to expectation original-
ism is more complex. In response to Dworkin’s distinction be-
tween semantic and expectation originalism, after all, Scalia did 
expressly avow his allegiance to the original public meaning of 
the constitutional text and disavow fidelity to “the concrete ex-
pectations of lawgivers.”20 On the other hand, Balkin is surely 
correct that much of Scalia’s writing, both academic and judicial, 
does appear to endorse and rely upon the expectation original-
ism that he purports to reject. Because Scalia’s efforts to explain 
away the apparent disparity ring, to me at least, rather false,21 
 16. See also, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOYOLA 
L. REV. 611, 622 (1999) (endorsing Dworkin’s distinction between “semantic” and “ex-
pectations” originalism, and explaining that the new brand of originalists are uncon-
cerned with “how the relevant generation of ratifiers expected or intended their textual 
handiwork would be applied to specific cases . . . except as circumstantial evidence of 
what the more technical words and phrases in the text might have meant to a reasonable 
listener”); Eric J. Segall, A Century Lost: The End of the Originalism Debate, 15 CONST. 
COMMENT. 411, 429–32 (1998) (arguing that no contemporary originalists endorse expec-
tation originalism). 
 17. Balkin, supra note 1, at 292. 
 18. Id. at 292–93. 
 19. Id. at 295. 
 20. Antonin Scalia, Response, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 7, at 
129, 144. 
 21. The most often noted example of Scalia’s seeming attachment to expectation 
originalism—remarked on by both Dworkin and Laurence Tribe in their separate com-
ments on Scalia’s Tanner Lecture—is his view that capital punishment cannot run afoul 
of the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishments because it is contem-
plated elsewhere in the constitutional text. See Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-
Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and 
Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 7, at 3, 46; Antonin Scalia, 
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determining how best to make sense of Scalia’s conflicting sig-
nals is no mean feat.22 I won’t try. Despite my quibbling, then, 
I’m content for present purposes to accept Balkin’s description 
of Scalia as a proponent of expectation orig
But even granting Scalia, who else? As best I could tell, 
Balkin cites only three other proponents of the expectation 
originalism that is his target —Robert Bork, Raoul Berger, and 
Clarence Thomas.23 Frankly, I am uncertain about Berger and 
Thomas; we are not favored with page citations or parentheticals 
that might either substantiate Balkin’s claim or at least help us to 
assess it.24 But the inclusion of Bork on this list strikes me as mis-
Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 863 (1989); Laurence H. Tribe, 
Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 7, at 65, 66; Dworkin, supra 
note 7, at 120. 
Scalia’s response to the objection that his argument here seems to be expectationist 
is to describe the original meaning of the relevant part of the Eighth Amendment as a 
bar to the infliction of punishments that “we consider cruel today.” Scalia, supra note 20, 
at 145. If that was the original public meaning, then the endorsement of capital punish-
ment in the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process, Double Jeopardy, and Grand Jury Clauses 
is simply evidence—very powerful evidence to be sure, but evidence only—that the death 
penalty does not fall within the extension of the concept of what Americans considered 
cruel in 1791. 
What makes this explanation unpersuasive, in my view, is the premise that the origi-
nal public meaning of “cruel” was “what we consider cruel today” rather than, well, 
“what is cruel.” Such a premise must be predicated, I think, on the view that the Consti-
tution (or at least the Eighth Amendment) does not constitutionalize moral principles as 
such but only the ratifying generation’s understanding of the moral principle. And that 
this is indeed Scalia’s view is suggested by his reference to “the moral perceptions of the 
time.” Id. (emphases added and omitted). 
To be sure, this could have been the original meaning of the text. But it is hardly the 
text’s most natural or obvious rendering. Moreover, Scalia seems to forget himself when 
concluding, in the very next sentence, that, in light of the Fifth Amendment, “it is en-
tirely clear that capital punishment, which was widely in use in 1791, does not violate the 
abstract moral principle of the Eighth Amendment.” Id. So which is it: the Eighth 
Amendment purports to (was understood to) constitutionalize an abstract moral princi-
ple or it purports to (was understood to) constitutionalize society’s beliefs about moral 
principles? That Scalia cannot have it both ways should be apparent to a moral realist. 
But I don’t think that even moral anti-realism offers a way out. While anti-realists of 
some stripes would indeed maintain that an attempt to constitutionalize a moral principle 
can only amount to constitutionalization of the society’s beliefs about moral principles, it 
does not follow that this truth forms any part of the content of the public understanding 
of the relevant text. Put another way, the public meaning or understanding of a text that 
purports to constitutionalize a moral principle is likely to include reference to society’s 
beliefs about the supposed moral principle only in a society of anti-realists. 
 22. For further evidence of Scalia’s inconsistencies on this question see Segall, su-
pra note 16, at 427–29. 
 23. See Balkin, supra note 1, at 295 n.9. 
 24. Balkin’s evidence for including Thomas among the small number of expectation 
originalists is a seven-page lecture published over a decade ago. Clarence Thomas, Judg-
ing, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1 (1996). For myself, I see nothing in the speech that suggests 
expectation originalism, and perhaps some evidence to the contrary. See id. at 5–6 
(“When it comes time to interpret the Constitution’s provisions, such as, for instance, the 
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taken—and revealingly so. Of the two pages in The Tempting of 
America to which Balkin draws our attention, one (page 159) has 
no obvious bearing on the question at all. And on the other page 
(144) Bork’s point is solely to make clear, in the face of appar-
ently conflicting views he had expressed two decades earlier, that 
he espouses original meaning originalism over original intent 
originalism; that is, he favors the original public meaning of the 
text over the subjective semantic intentions of any specific indi-
viduals. But this is not to espouse fidelity to the original expecta-
tions the framers or ratifiers might have had about how the tex-
tual meaning would apply. 
Were there any real doubt about this, consider Bork’s fa-
mously unpersuasive effort to establish that Brown v. Board of 
Education is consistent with originalism. That argument, most 
readers will recall, runs like this: the original understanding of 
the Equal Protection Clause incorporated the principle of 
“equality” or “equality before the law”; the ratifiers believed or 
assumed that racial segregation was consistent with such equal-
ity; and, when the inconsistency became apparent, the Court 
properly gave effect to the originally understood principle and 
not to the originally expected, though mistaken, application of 
that principle.25 Whatever the argument’s faults,26 it rests 
squarely on Borks rejection of expectation originalism and his 
endorsement of something very much like the meaning-and-
principle originalism that Balkin favors—though admittedly 
without Balkin’s emphasis on the plasticity, contestability or flu-
idity of underlying principles. 
Perhaps Balkin is misled into thinking that expectation 
originalism is more widespread than it is by his view that 
“[w]hen people use the term ‘original understanding,’ and some-
times even ‘original meaning’–as Scalia does–they are actually 
talking about original expected application.”27 Again, the basis 
Speech or Press Clauses of the First Amendment, reasonable minds can certainly differ 
as to their exact meaning. But that does not mean that there is no right or correct answer; 
that there are no clear, eternal principles recognized and put into motion by our founding 
documents.”) (emphasis added). 
 25. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL 
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 81–83 (1990). 
 26. The most glaring fault is that Bork renders the original understanding at such a 
high level of generality—“equality” and “equality before the law”—as to sacrifice 
originalism’s pretensions to serious historical inquiry and its promise to impose meaning-
ful constraints on judges. 
 27. Balkin, supra note 1, at 296. 
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for this claim escapes me; indeed, I think the claim is unlikely to 
be true. 
For a keen illustration, consider how Justice Scalia analyzed 
the question, raised in Minnesota v. Dickerson,28 of whether the 
Fourth Amendment permits police to seize contraband detected 
during a Terry frisk.29 After insisting that “the terms in the Con-
stitution must be given the meaning ascribed to them at the time 
of their ratification,”30 Scalia proceeded to recognize that the 
scope of the application of those terms could change. “[E]ven if 
a ‘frisk’ prior to arrest would have been considered impermissi-
ble in 1791 . . . perhaps it is only since that time that concealed 
weapons capable of harming the interrogator quickly . . . have 
become common—which might alter the judgment of what is 
‘reasonable’ under the original standard.”31 Here, original mean-
ing is expressly distinguished from original expected application. 
Or take the constitutional grounds for impeachment: “trea-
son, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.”32 One 
who emphasizes that we should follow the 1789 meaning of the 
word misdemeanor—serious wrongdoing—and not its current 
meaning—minor offense—would be most unlikely to think a 
president impeachable for all and only those offenses that were 
considered serious in 1791. To the contrary, as to any conduct 
(oh, I don’t know—adultery?) that would have been considered 
a misdemeanor in 1789 under the 1789 definition and that is con-
sidered a misdemeanor in 2007 under the 2007 definition—i.e., 
some conduct that was deemed to be serious wrongdoing in 1789 
but is only a petty offense today—the point of advocating fidelity 
to the “original meaning” or “original understanding” is pre-
cisely to oppose acting in accordance with the “original expected 
application.” 
Balkin declares portentously that “[t]he concepts embodied 
by the words of constitutional text and the principles underlying 
the text, and not their original expected application, are the cen-
tral concern of constitutional interpretation.”33 My point thus far 
is that it would be hard to find an originalist who’d dissent. 
 28. 508 U.S. 366 (1993). 
 29. This very helpful illustration was (as far as I know) initially provided in Law-
rence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN L. REV. 
395, 398–99 (1995), and reintroduced in Segall, supra note 16, at 428–29. 
 30. 508 U.S. at 379 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 31. Id. at 382. 
 32. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. 
 33. Balkin, supra note 1, at 302. 
!!BERMAN-242-ORIGINALISM AND ITS DISCONTENTS2.DOC 3/5/2008  2:47:28 PM 
390 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 24:383 
 
B. BALKINIAN ORIGINALISM AND LIVING 
CONSTITUTIONALISM: NOT A FALSE CHOICE 
Conceivably, one could respond to this objection by mar-
shaling more evidence to support the empirical proposition that 
many theorists of originalism do in fact espouse expectations 
originalism. Such a showing would surprise me but would scrape 
no skin off my own, non-originalist, nose. But Balkin is more 
likely, I think, to deflect the objection by insisting that it targets 
a matter of only minor importance. The key claims in Abortion 
and Original Meaning, he might say, are not empirical but con-
ceptual or normative. They concern, not how many originalists 
presently endorse expectation originalism, but what follows once 
we reject it. 
I agree that this is the claim of importance. Nonetheless, the 
attention I have given Balkin’s empirical contentions is still war-
ranted. For one thing, a surprising number of other smart and 
careful scholars appear to believe, just as Balkin does, that ex-
pectation originalism enjoys vibrant support.34 It seems plausible 
to suppose that a sedulous effort (which I do not claim to have 
undertaken) to confirm or falsify this assumption might have 
some effect on how the debate over originalism will continue to 
unfold. Furthermore, and of more particular present relevance, 
readers who agree that almost nobody of any seriousness accepts 
expectation originalism should recognize as well that almost eve-
rybody even among the originalists appreciates that correct ap-
plications of the constitutional meaning can change over time. 
Indeed, McConnell insisted on precisely this a decade ago.35 So if 
living constitutionalism is merely the view that correct applica-
tions of constitutional meaning can change over time—i.e., that 
conduct constitutional at time t1 can become unconstitutional at 
t2 (or vice versa)—then, sure, originalism embraces living consti-
tutionalism. But the near-universal assumption is that living con-
stitutionalism accommodates diachronic change different in 
character and magnitude from what originalism permits. I as-
sume that it is this contention that Balkin aims to deny when 
averring that originalism and living constitutionalism present “a 
false choice.” And if that is his object, it must be accomplished 
not by his rejection of expectation originalism but by his affirma-
 34. See, e.g., KERMIT ROOSEVELT III, THE MYTH OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 47–58 
(2006); Aileen Kavanagh, Original Intention, Enacted Text, and Constitutional Interpreta-
tion, 47 AM. J. JURIS. 255, 265 (2002). 
 35. See McConnell, supra note 15; see also, e.g., Lessig, supra note 29, at 396. 
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tion of what he calls “the method of text and principle.”36 So if 
Balkin’s “false choice” claim is itself false, it will not be because 
originalists reject his method of text and principle but because 
living constitutionalists do.37 One important upshot of the argu-
ment in Section I.A, then, is to underscore that the readers he 
must seek to persuade are not the originalists but their oppo-
nents. 
The remainder of this Part argues: that living constitutional-
ists do reject Balkin’s method; that Balkin provides no argument 
for why they ought not to reject it; and that, to the contrary, 
much of Balkin’s focus on extrajudicial constitutional interpreta-
tion and the role of social movements (a rightful and illuminat-
ing focus, in my view) should lead him to join the living constitu-
tionalists in rejecting the method of text and principle that he 
advocates. 
1. 
What reason could anyone have for rejecting the method of 
text and principle? Could it really be that constitutional interpre-
tation does not “require[] fidelity to the original meaning of the 
Constitution and to the principles that underlie the text”? Much 
depends, I think, on what is meant by the recurring and ambigu-
ous phrase: “the principles that underlie the text.” 
Taken in isolation, the phrase permits at least two distinct 
interpretations: the principles that, in a Dworkinian vein, make 
best sense of the text or show it in its morally best light; or the 
principles that in actual historical fact were intended by the 
framers, or understood by the ratifiers, to be captured by the 
 36. Balkin, supra note 1, at 293. 
 37. A note on terminology: In my opinion, the negation of originalism is more 
felicitously rendered not as living constitutionalism but as non-originalism. Very briefly, I 
take originalism to be the view that some specified class of constitutional interpreters 
(paradigmatically judges, but, on some accounts, everybody) owes a strict obligation of 
fidelity to some aspect of the Constitution’s original character—that the interpreters 
must always follow the original object, at least when it is adequately discoverable. The 
negation of this view—i.e., the claim that it is not the case that interpreters owe strict fi-
delity to the specified aspect of the Constitution’s original character—would be, simply, 
non-originalism. In arguing that, over at least some range of cases, interpreters ought to 
abandon original meaning (intent, understanding, principles, or what-have-you) in favor 
of contemporary meanings or values, living constitutionalism comprises a subset of non-
originalism but is not entailed by it. In any event, as the distinction I favor between non-
originalism and living constitutionalism is not essential to a diagnosis of what I take to be 
unsatisfactory in Balkin’s account, I follow him in contrasting originalism to living consti-
tutionalism. 
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chosen text.38 In fact, though, Balkin makes adequately clear that 
he means the latter, not the former. What we are searching for, 
he explains, are “the general principles that animated the 
text”39—those that the people who drafted the text “sought to 
endorse,” “sought to refer to,” or “sought to establish.”40 
Balkin’s method of text and principle, we might say, is a method 
of text and original principle. Living constitutionalists, in con-
trast, might be thought to employ a method of text and evolving 
or contemporary principle. 
To appreciate the difference, consider any constitutional 
provision, T, that is most appropriately read as referring to a 
moral principle, not just to a legal rule or even a standard. Now 
suppose that T is sufficiently vague or ambiguous to accommo-
date or refer to two (or more) distinct moral principles, P1 and 
P2. Finally, imagine that an interpreter is convinced that P1 is the 
superior moral principle, both by her own lights and by the lights 
of a substantial majority of the contemporary populace, yet that, 
according to the best historical evidence, the framers and ratifi-
ers of T sought to refer to P2. The question is whether our inter-
preter’s obligation of fidelity to the Constitution entails an obli-
gation to adopt P2 as her constitutional interpretation—as her 
understanding, that is, of what the Constitution means. Balkin’s 
method of text and original principle seems to answer that she 
does. The living constitutionalist’s interpretive method (or at 
least a possible method of living constitutionalism) answers that 
she does not. 
This abstract problematic can be made more concrete. Con-
sider, to start, the Free Exercise Clause. Whereas the framers 
might have sought thereby to endorse the principle that all reli-
gious believers ought to be entitled to worship as they choose, 
we might now pay more allegiance to the kindred—but dis-
tinct—moral principle that all persons, believers, agnostics and 
atheists alike, should be entitled to worship, or not, as they 
choose. The Free Speech Clause might have been drafted and 
ratified to endorse a principle related to democratic self-
 38. Underlie means “to be the support or basis of.” AMERICAN HERITAGE 
DICTIONARY 1318 (2d ed. 1982); WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL 
DICTIONARY 2489 (Philip Babcock Grove ed., 1993) (“to be at the basis of: form the 
foundation of: support”). A principle could provide moral support for the text in the 
sense of justifying our contemporary obedience to it, or respect for it; or it could provide 
causal support in the sense of explaining why the text was adopted. 
 39. Balkin, supra note 1, at 302 (emphasis added). 
 40. Id. at 303, 319. 
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governance; today, perhaps, we understand it to embody a prin-
ciple of individual self-realization. The framers and ratifiers of 
the Self-incrimination Clause might have aimed merely to out-
law a particular historical practice and not to refer to a moral 
principle at all; today, perhaps, we understand it to endorse a 
principle of human dignity. 
While examples of this sort could be multiplied,41 we might 
finish by returning to our previous discussion of Bork’s flimsy 
defense of Brown. The defense seems lame precisely because we 
do not think that equality, simpliciter is an accurate rendering of 
the principle that the framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment actually sought to endorse. We believe that the 
animating principle was more determinate than that—civil equal-
ity, or formal equality, or anti-subordination, or equal regard, or 
color-blindness, etc. Living constitutionalists would permit inter-
preters to eschew whatever equality-type principle the framers 
and ratifiers actually “sought to endorse” in favor of the equal-
ity-type principle—a principle, mind you, that the text can 
bear—that better suits our contemporary needs and moral val-
ues. 
Balkin is far from the first scholar to conclude that a focus 
on constitutional principles effaces the originalism/non-
originalism distinction.42 But because an approach of the sort just 
sketched plainly allows for greater flexibility of bottom-line re-
sult than does the Balkinian approach that permits interpreters 
to argue only about different applications of the originally in-
tended principle, it seems to follow that originalism and living 
constitutionalism continue to offer a true, rather than false, 
choice. 
 41. Keep in mind that these examples are offered only to further illustrate how liv-
ing constitutionalism could differ from Balkin’s method of text and original principle. For 
this limited purpose, lengthy argument about the relevant history is quite beside the 
point. I assume that it is similarly unnecessary at this stage to elaborate on a theory of 
how to individuate moral principles. 
 42. See, e.g., Segall, supra note 16, at 432–33 (“Once strict originalism [i.e., expecta-
tion originalism] is taken off the table, and it has been off the table for a long time, there 
are no stakes left to arguing about the originalism question. . . . Th[e] move from specific 
intentions to general principles . . . eliminates any meaningful distinction between 
originalism and non-originalism because the Constitution’s broad phrases are defined at 
a level of generality that make them useless in hard cases for anything other than sym-
bolic purposes.”); Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism as Transformative Politics, 63 TUL. L. 
REV. 1599, 1612–13 (1989); ROOSEVELT, supra note 34, at 47–58 (arguing that the impor-
tance of the originalism/living constitutionalism debate “is drastically overstated,” but 
starting, like Balkin, from what I have argued is the mistaken premise that “living consti-
tutionalists and originalists share th[e] assumption” that originalism prescribes fidelity to 
originally expected applications). 
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2. 
To conclude that the “false choice” thesis is itself false is not 
yet, of course, to suggest that the alternatives are equally attrac-
tive or even that the method favored by living constitutionalism 
ought to be considered truly eligible. Perhaps, that is, living con-
stitutionalism offers no true choice as against originalism not be-
cause it directs interpreters to act just as originalism, properly 
understood, does, but because the competing direction it pro-
vides cannot be defended. Unfortunately, Abortion and Original 
Meaning does not appear to develop any arguments to that ef-
fect. Instead, Balkin treats the proposition that constitutional in-
terpretation requires “fidelity to the words of the text, under-
stood in terms of their original meaning, and to the principles 
that [originally] underlie the text” as an essentially undefended 
“premise” or “assumption.”43 
Addressing all the arguments that have been provided else-
where against living constitutionalism would require a paper of 
its own. Here, I can offer only a much-condensed sketch of why 
Balkin’s own trenchant analysis of social movements suggests 
that his proposed method of text and original principle is actu-
ally less faithful to our practice, and less attractive, than is the 
living constitutionalists’ method of, let us say, text and evolving 
principle. 
The basic tension in Balkin’s account arises from his privi-
leging of extra-judicial constitutional interpretation. “Theories 
of constitutional interpretation,” he says, “should start with in-
terpretation by citizens as the standard case.”44 Social move-
ments in particular serve as principal drivers of constitutional 
understandings, “constitutional culture,” and “constitutional 
doctrine.” 45 But social movements do not view their task as 
maintaining fidelity to the past. “Restoration” and “redemption” 
might be their “key tropes,”46 but we should not confuse rhetoric 
with reality. The truth is that citizens, social movements, and po-
litical parties do more than argue about “how best to apply” 
originally intended constitutional principles in contemporary cir-
cumstances.47 They argue as well about what the constitutional 
principles are—which is why those who would challenge a given 
 43. Balkin, supra note 1, at 294–95, 302. 
 44. Id. at 307. 
 45. Id. at 308. 
 46. Id. at 301. 
 47. E.g., id. at 293. 
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movement’s agenda often argue not that it applies the originally 
understood principle incorrectly, but that the principle it pushes 
is not of constitutional stature at all. This, for example, is how 
the defenders of affirmative action respond to the living consti-
tutionalists (masquerading as crusaders for originalism, as living 
constitutionalists frequently do) who champion a constitutional 
principle of color-blindness. 
And if a movement prevails in persuading the general pub-
lic to accept the principle it puts forth as a constitutional one? 
Well, as far as I can tell, Balkin provides no reason why judicial 
interpretation should not follow suit, least of all that judicial re-
sistance to a successful extrajudicial interpretation not predi-
cated on historical fidelity is categorically mandated. To the con-
trary, that judicial interpretation may follow and endorse non-
originalist but popularly accepted constitutional interpretations 
is, I take it, at least part of what it means for judicial interpreta-
tion to be “parasitic” upon extrajudicial interpretation.48 No 
doubt one could maintain that courts must refuse to sanction the 
new extrajudicial understanding of constitutional principle that 
the successful social movement has wrought on the grounds that 
that understanding lacks historical fidelity and therefore legiti-
macy. But such an attitude would, I think, rest on either a bi-
zarre misconception of what social movements are for—they 
serve, after all, as advocates for a vision of the political good, not 
as historians—or an unrealistic sense of how long courts might 
(or should) stand against successful popular mobilizations. It’s 
hard to see Jack Balkin falling into either error.49 
 48. Id. at 307. Incidentally, I am in substantial agreement with Balkin’s ruminations 
about the relationship between constitutional doctrine and constitutional interpreta-
tion—most notably the idea, see, e.g., id. at 307, 314–15, that judge-announced constitu-
tional doctrine serves to implement, and is therefore not identical to, judicial interpreta-
tions of constitutional meaning. See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision 
Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1 (2004); Mitchell N. Berman, Aspirational Rights and the Two-
Output Thesis, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 220 (2006), http://www.harvardlawreview.org/ fo-
rum/issues/119/march06/berman.pdf. I am very skeptical, though, that a proper under-
standing of this distinction will provide any avenue of escape from the conclusion in the 
text. 
 49. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Roe v. Wade: An Engine of Controversy, in WHAT 
ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID 3, 23–24 (Jack M. Balkin ed. 2005) (“[C]ourts, 
whether they like it or not, always work in conversation with the political branches in 
developing constitutional norms. . . . The work of courts, important as it may be, is always 
an intermediate and intermediary feature of a much longer process of legal development 
that stretches back into the past and forward into the future.”). 
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II. ABORTION 
Even if the larger ambition of Abortion and Original Mean-
ing is to reshape debates over constitutional interpretation gen-
erally, the greater bulk of the piece explores the original meaning 
of the Fourteenth Amendment and draws forth implications for 
the abortion debate. In the smallest of nutshells, Balkin argues 
that the various clauses of section 1 of that amendment were in-
tended to constitutionalize, among other things, a principle of 
equal citizenship and a prohibition on class legislation. Laws that 
criminalize even first-trimester abortion violate these principles, 
and are therefore unconstitutional, even though the framers and 
ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment might not have so real-
ized. 
This is deeply interesting stuff, though I am insufficiently 
knowledgeable of the relevant history and secondary literature 
to assess it very intelligently. My principal critical reaction, how-
ever, is to question whether Balkin’s historical and interpretive 
claims are either necessary or sufficient to support the holding in 
Roe. 
The ordinary, perhaps inescapable, path toward justifying 
the conclusion that legislative prohibitions on early-stage abor-
tions are unconstitutional consists of two steps: Establishing, 
first, that prohibitions on early stage abortions require weighty 
justification; and second, that the state’s interest in protecting 
the life, and opportunity for birth, of the unborn fetus does not 
supply a justification of requisite weight. Of the two, the first is 
much the easier. 
Balkin’s argument is geared principally to tackling that first 
task—that is, to establishing that there exists a constitutional 
right to choose an abortion.50 But even granting its plausibility, I 
confess to thinking that the more usual move, of the sort hinted 
at in Roe and developed somewhat further in Casey, is adequate 
too. Roughly, and without elaboration or defense, I take that ar-
gument to be: (1) that various constitutional clauses—the Privi-
lege and Immunities Clause, the Due Process Clauses, and the 
Ninth Amendment among them—are appropriately interpreted 
to provide heightened protection for liberty interests of special 
importance to the individual’s prospects for realizing a life of 
meaning and fulfillment; and (2) that a pregnant woman’s inter-
 50. Actually, he argues provocatively that there exist two distinct constitutional 
rights to abortion. For purposes of my concern, however, we can put that wrinkle aside. 
!!BERMAN-242-ORIGINALISM AND ITS DISCONTENTS2.DOC 3/5/2008  2:47:28 PM 
2007] ORIGINALISM AND ITS DISCONTENTS 397 
 
est in terminating her pregnancy qualifies as an interest of pre-
cisely this sort. In short, then, I think that Balkin’s analysis is 
very possibly adequate, but not necessary, to the first step on the 
path to the conclusion that abortion prohibitions are unconstitu-
tional. 
In any event, this is, as I have said, the easier step.51 The 
more challenging one is to establish that protection of the un-
born does not provide the justification needed—that prohibi-
tions on abortion do not merely implicate or infringe a constitu-
tional right to choose an abortion, but violate it. On this score, 
however, Balkin offers very little. To be sure, he does argue that 
a fetus is not properly understood as a person within the mean-
ing of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.52 And I 
fully agree. But I think that most abortion opponents do too. 
Unfortunately, this conclusion does not get Balkin where he 
needs to go, for the compelling interests that a state might pur-
sue are not limited to the protection of constitutional persons. If 
fetuses are persons in the morally relevant sense, or if they are 
moral rights-bearing entities, then it seems likely, perhaps obvi-
ous, that the state’s interest in protecting them should suffice to 
justify infringements on the constitutional rights of pregnant 
women. Some response to this objection is required, I should 
think, to justify the result in Roe. Because I do not think Balkin 
supplies an adequate response in this paper—indeed, it is not 
clear to me that he supplies any response at all—I conclude that 
his analysis of abortion, while surely of interest, is neither neces-
sary nor sufficient to establish that the state may not criminalize 
first-trimester abortions. 
The great oddity is that, elsewhere, Balkin did expressly 
recognize the need for supporters of the Roe result to go beyond 
the “fetuses are not constitutional persons” argument. In the 
mock opinion he produced for his edited volume, What Roe v. 
Wade Should Have Said: The Nation’s Top Legal Experts Re-
write America’s Most Controversial Decision, Balkin (writing 
 51. Critics of the abortion right often seem to view the diversity of arguments ad-
vanced to ground the right as evidence of the proponents’ result-orientedness, even of 
their moral or intellectual bankruptcy. I see it, instead, as largely a consequence of schol-
ars’ efforts (perhaps unnecessary, but sincerely felt) to identify textual homes for a right 
that is more forthrightly derived by structural reasoning. When one thinks, not of bits of 
text viewed piecemeal, but of the Constitution’s broad and deep commitment to princi-
ples of individual liberty and equality, the conclusion that legislative prohibitions of abor-
tion cannot stand unless supported by weighty justification strikes me wholly overdeter-
mined. 
 52. Balkin, supra note 1, at 333–337. 
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then as Chief Justice Balkin) reasoned that the precise contours 
of most abortion laws—most notably, the exceptions they fre-
quently grant for pregnancies produced as a result of rape or in-
cest and their total exemption from criminal liability of the preg-
nant woman herself—undermine the regulating states’ 
contentions that they genuinely ascribe moral personhood to the 
nonviable fetus.53 This is a not-uncommon argumentative strat-
egy,54 and one with which I have considerable sympathy.  
In skeletal form, the version of the argument that I favor 
rests on the notion that all laws reflect a balancing of interests 
and that a law prohibiting abortion could reflect two very differ-
ent types of balancing. To oversimplify, the law could issue from 
a recognition that the costs that the law imposes on women is 
very substantial, but that the benefits (in terms of protection of 
an entity with a moral status equivalent, or roughly equivalent, 
to persons already born) are even greater. Alternatively, it could 
be based on a judgment that fetuses do not have the moral status 
of persons, and therefore that the state’s interests in prohibiting 
abortion (interests that can include, but need not be limited to, 
the protection of potential life) fall rather short of compelling, 
but that interests of such weight nonetheless outweigh the coun-
tervailing liberty interests of women. In shorthand, we might say 
that the law could be understood by its drafters and proponents 
as either high-cost/higher-benefit or low-cost/medium-benefit. 
Now, if the judiciary were in a position to conclude that a 
nonviable fetus does, or does not, have the moral status akin to a 
neonate, then the understanding about the moral status of the 
fetus held by the state (so to speak) would be, I think, neither 
here nor there. If a nonviable fetus lacks substantial moral 
status, then prohibitions on early-stage abortion do not serve a 
compelling interest regardless of what the state believes. Simi-
larly (though possibly not quite as obviously), if the nonviable 
fetus does have substantial moral status, then early-stage abor-
tion bans do serve a compelling interest even if the state thinks 
that they don’t. But the judiciary is not positioned to make either 
such conclusion. And that’s why the state legislature’s actual be-
liefs about the moral status of the fetus become critical. 
 53. Jack M. Balkin, (judgment of the Court), in WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD 
HAVE SAID, supra note 49, at 31, 47–52. 
 54. See, e.g., ROOSEVELT, supra note 34, at 118–30; Guido Calabresi, The Supreme 
Court, 1990 Term—Foreword: Antidiscrimination and Constitutional Accountability: 
What the Bork-Brennan Debate Ignores, 105 HARV. L. REV. 80 (1991). 
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It follows that the question for a judiciary that has deter-
mined that the liberty interests of women are constitutionally en-
titled to great weight, is whether to accept the state’s representa-
tion that its restrictions on abortion in fact issue from an 
assessment of the first sort and not of the second. To put the 
point differently, the state has a compelling interest in protecting 
against destruction beings that it reasonably believes have a 
moral status equivalent to, or close to, that of a neonate. So in 
this unusual case, the judicial question of whether the state’s in-
terest is compelling is parasitic upon what the state actually be-
lieves about the nature of the thing that it is endeavoring to pro-
tect. But the state has reasons to misrepresent (to the courts, 
perhaps even to itself) what its actual beliefs are. So the courts 
ought not to simply accept without question the state’s represen-
tations as to its actual beliefs. To do so would be to substantially 
under-protect the abortion right. How the courts ought to pro-
ceed in general—including what inference the Supreme Court 
should have drawn about the Texas law in 1973, and what infer-
ences it should draw about the beliefs that have motivated other 
abortion laws at other times—are questions that I cannot ad-
dress here, except to note my conviction that the skeptical infer-
ence is sometimes, perhaps often, appropriate. 
That no argument of this form appears in Abortion and 
Original Meaning is conspicuous and, therefore, most intriguing. 
Perhaps it is simple oversight. Or perhaps Balkin has now dis-
cerned failings in the argument that had not previously occurred 
to him. Either way, I think we need to hear more about why 
bans on first-trimester abortions cannot justifiably infringe the 
abortion right (even assuming that nonviable fetuses are not, 
constitutionally speaking, persons) before we can conclude, with 
Balkin, that such bans are unconstitutional. 
CONCLUSION 
The debate over originalism concerns whether constitu-
tional interpretation must be a search for the original under-
standing (or intent, or meaning, or the like). It is a debate over 
whether the correct meaning of the Constitution—and not just 
its case-specific applications—can change from t to t1 even ab-
sent constitutional amendment. It seems to me that there can be 
only two answers to this question—”yes” and “no”—and that 
they conflict. The analysis that would show these answers to pre-
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sent “a false choice” or to be “opposite sides of the same coin”55 
is not, I predict, in the cards. 
My answer to this central question—an answer that, admit-
tedly, I have not defended here—is affirmative. That makes me a 
non-originalist. It seems to me that Balkin’s privileging of consti-
tutional interpretation by social movements (which are com-
pelled neither by logic nor by political morality to maintain his-
torical fidelity), over interpretation by judges, ought to lead him 
to answer that question in the affirmative as well. But perhaps 
I’m mistaken. Perhaps Balkin really is an originalist. If so, I 
would be eager to see his reasons for concluding that the 
originalist answer is better than the non-originalist answer, rather 
than that the two answers are one. 
* * * 
In his reply to his commentators,56 Balkin treats my own 
contribution with seriousness, respect, and care. Unfortunately, 
much of what he says about my analysis causes me to conclude 
that I have not succeeded in making myself entirely clear. Some 
response is therefore warranted. Given the length and compre-
hensiveness of that reply, there are a large number of claims to 
which I’d like to respond. But I will limit myself to trying to 
make two points. First, I will restate my core criticism of Balkin’s 
thesis and explain why I believe that it survives the arguments 
that Balkin musters in his reply. Second, I will briefly address 
some of the respects in which Balkin’s analysis suggests a misun-
derstanding of what I have attempted to convey. 
Balkin’s “false choice” claim is false 
Although Abortion and Original Meaning is rich in argu-
ments, I understand it to advance two core claims—a normative 
claim about how the Constitution ought to be interpreted, and 
something close to a conceptual claim about the range of possi-
ble alternatives to the normative question. The former is his 
proposed method of text and principle (which I will call TP), and 
the latter is his claim that originalism and living constitutional-
ism present a false choice (which I will call FC). Stated slightly 
more formally, the claims are these: 
 55. Balkin, supra note 1, at 348. 
 56. Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST. 
COMMENT. 427 (2007).  
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TP: “Constitutional interpretation requires fidelity to the 
original meaning of the Constitution and to the prin-
ciples that underlie the text.”57 
FC: There is no difference between originalism and living 
constitutionalism because both theories can and 
should affirm TP. 
My central point has been that Balkin’s “false choice” claim 
is incorrect: there is a real choice between originalism and living 
constitutionalism. Balkin’s argument to the contrary commits the 
fallacy of equivocation. Here, in a condensed presentation, is 
how I take my argument to run: 
(1) A given text can, and at least some provisions of the 
U.S. Constitution do, bear the meaning of more than 
one moral principle, i.e., more than one moral princi-
ple can be attributed to the same constitutional text. 
(2) Therefore, “the principles that underlie the text” is 
ambiguous. It can refer to (at least): (a) the principles 
that the framers or ratifiers actually sought to consti-
tutionalize by means of the chosen text, or (b) the 
moral principles that fit the text and that, from the in-
terpreter’s perspective, best justify our continued 
obedience to it. 
(3) By substitution, TP comes in at least two variants: 
(a) constitutional interpretation requires fidelity to the 
original meaning of the Constitution and to the prin-
ciples that the framers or ratifiers actually sought to 
constitutionalize by means of the chosen text; and 
(b) constitutional interpretation requires fidelity to 
the original meaning of the Constitution and to the 
principles that fit the text and that, from the inter-
preter’s perspective, best justify our continued obedi-
ence to it. 
(4) Originalism is committed to (a), so call it TP-O; at 
least some Living Constitutionalists endorse(b), so call 
it TP-L. 
(5) TP-O and TP-L are functionally non-equivalent: 
When employed in constitutional argument, they will 
 57. Balkin, supra note 1, at 293; See Balkin, supra note 56, at 428 (“I argue that fi-
delity to the Constitution means fidelity to the original meaning of the Constitution’s text 
and to the principles that underlie the text.”). 
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not produce identical sets of “interpretations of the 
Constitution” or of specific constitutional holdings. 
(6) Therefore, FC is false. There is a difference between 
originalism and living constitutionalism because the 
former and the latter do not endorse variants of TP 
that are the same or functionally equivalent. 
In the course of my comment, I expressed the view (which I 
was not alone in holding)58 that Balkin himself espouses TP-O. I 
marshaled evidence for this conclusion from various passages in 
Abortion and Original Meaning.59 Balkin addresses this claim at 
some length in his reply.60 Suffice it to say, that I now think (but 
confess to not being entirely certain) that I got him wrong, that 
he does not really mean that interpreters owe fidelity to the 
principles that the ratifiers sought to endorse, but only that they 
owe fidelity to the principles that the text that the ratifiers did 
endorse can bear. As Balkin says, “the key issue is . . . that con-
stitutional principles must be ones ‘that the text can bear.’”61 In 
any event, which view Balkin himself holds is not important to 
my argument. The critical point is only that these two positions 
exist and that they are not equivalent. 
But is that claim mistaken? Balkin challenges some of the 
examples I put forth to illustrate my premise (1). In fact, I be-
lieve that my particular illustrations survive his challenge. But no 
matter. My illustrations were purely illustrative. Even if Balkin 
and I end up disagreeing abut individual cases, I see nothing in 
his reply that should lead one to question that at least some of 
the constitutional text is sufficiently ambiguous to mean or refer 
to more than one principle of political morality. To be sure, he 
intimates that (1) depends upon the erroneous assumption that 
the principles underlying the constitutional text “will have to be 
stated at a fairly low level of generality.”62 But I did not take my-
self to be making any such assumption and, yet more impor-
tantly, the premise doesn’t depend upon it. I see nothing else in 
Balkin’s reply that would cause trouble for my argument. And 
because (2) and (3) follow straightforwardly from (1), and be-
cause (4) and (5) would seem uncontroversial given (3), I believe 
that my challenge to FC remains sound. 
 58. See Ethan Leib, The Perpetual Anxiety of Living Constitutionalism, 24 CONST. 
COMMENT. 353, 354–56 (2007). 
 59. See supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text. 
 60. Balkin, supra note 56, at 487–519. 
 61. Id. at 488. 
 62. Id. at 487. 
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The method of text and principle 
Balkin expends considerable energy elaborating the method 
of text and principle, and defending it against attacks from his 
critics. I am supposed to be one of those critics. Thus, for exam-
ple, I am said to object both “that political and social movements 
do not use the method of text and principle,” and “that it is dan-
gerous to adopt a constitutional theory that incorporates and jus-
tifies the work of political and social movements.”63 I do not in 
fact believe either of those things, and I am disheartened to learn 
that my text has betrayed me so badly. 
Of course political and social movements use the method of 
text and principle (or something like it).64 What else would they 
use? The question is which method of text and principle—TP-O 
or TP-L? Probably both, I suppose. But given their aims (which 
Balkin describes in rich historical detail and with eloquence) and 
their lack of training in historical methods, I conclude that they 
mostly employ TP-L. I don’t know what in my paper invited the 
conclusion that I believe that social movements “often make 
claims based on simple policy grounds.”65 And when I suggested 
we can’t trust their rhetoric, I meant only that we cannot blithely 
accept whatever claims they might sometimes make to be em-
ploying TP-O, not that their “arguments for restoration and re-
demption [are] nothing more than rhetorical tropes.”66  
Far from believing that a theory that justifies the work of 
political and social movements is dangerous, my claim is closer 
to the opposite. I believe that the account of the evolution of 
constitutional meaning that Balkin describes and champions in 
his reply is largely descriptively accurate, largely normatively at-
tractive, and at least partly inescapable for a polity constituted as 
ours is. The point of my remarks in Section I.B.2 was to chal-
 63. Id. at 504; see also id. at 512–13. 
 64. The parenthetical in the text is necessitated by my belief that social movements 
(as well as judges or individual citizens, for that matter) are not rigidly bound by the 
original meaning of textual provisions that state something other than principles. But this 
is not the place to elaborate that particular view. 
 65. Balkin, supra note 56, at 504. 
 66. Id. at 507 (emphasis added). Admittedly, I probably invited that misunderstand-
ing by contending that “social movements do not view their task as maintaining fidelity 
to the past.” Supra at 394. I’m confident that’s not what they view as their principal task. 
Their principal task is forward-looking. But in pursuing their forward-looking goals, I 
agree that they frequently feel themselves to be maintaining fidelity to at least an imag-
ined past. In short, the truth is more nuanced than my very brief remarks might have 
suggested. 
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lenge TP-O by suggesting that it does not take social movements 
seriously enough. The conclusion rests on three premises. 
First, as just discussed, social movements employ TP-L to a 
significant extent. Second, the constitutional understandings that 
arise by application of TP-L can secure widespread popular en-
dorsement or can underwrite stable governmental practices that 
depart from what TP-O would authorize. Third, when that hap-
pens, it is at least sometimes appropriate for judicial constitu-
tional interpretation to tract TP-L rather than TP-O. Therefore, 
TP-O cannot be correct as a complete or total account even of 
how courts ought to perform their role in our scheme of constitu-
tional governance.67 
 67. I have not provided much argument for the critical third premise beyond my 
brief remarks in the final paragraph of Section I.B.2, including my observation that 
“Balkin provides no reason [against it].” Supra at 395. If Balkin now recognizes that TP-
O and TP-L are not identical and endorses the latter, then I’d suppose that he accepts the 
third premise. But an argument to the contrary might possibly be grounded in Balkin’s 
remarks about the value of “preserv[ing] legal meaning over time.” Balkin, supra note 1, 
at 429. Surely the preservation of legal meaning across time is a desideratum of a legal 
system. But I do not take Balkin to be contending that it is a conclusive demand of logic 
or political morality. That, I think, would be quite mistaken. 
